

COMPETITION INTEGRITY IN PROFESSIONAL BASS FISHING

A Risk Perspective and Governance Framework Review

Jim Brown, Managing Principal, S.P.O.R.T. Enterprise Risk Advisory Practice

S.P.O.R.T. | ENTERPRISE RISK ADVISORY PRACTICE

October 2026

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....3

Scope, Methodology & Limitations.....4

The Core Distinction: Actual vs. Perceived Integrity Failure.....4

Why This Warrants Review Now.....6

What Existing Controls Already Do.....8

What the Evidence Shows.....8

The Bottom Line.....12

Where This Risk Sits in the Enterprise.....13

Monitoring, Ownership & Escalation.....15

Governance Response Options.....15

Comparative Sports Governance.....17

Closing Observations.....20

Appendix A: Full Professional Bass Fishing Enterprise Risk Taxonomy (L1-L5).....22

Appendix B: COSO ERM Methodology Note.....32

Notes.....37

About the Author.....41

Executive Summary

Professional bass fishing does not need evidence of widespread corruption or systemic manipulation for competition integrity to warrant board-level attention. The relevant question is not whether the sport has a cheating problem. It is whether uncertainty surrounding the fairness, authenticity, and credibility of competition could materially affect the sport's commercial and competitive future.

Competition integrity, understood this way, involves two related risks. The first is **actual integrity failure** — manipulation, prohibited conduct, scoring error, collusion, unauthorized information, or some other event that actually affects a competition. The second is **perceived integrity failure** — constituents cannot reasonably determine whether a result is legitimate, or lose confidence in the process used to establish its legitimacy, because the detection, investigative, evidentiary, or adjudicative mechanisms involved are not regarded as sufficiently reliable or credible. This second risk matters even when manipulation is never established: a governing body can suffer real consequences from a contested, poorly corroborated, or opaque adjudication whether or not the underlying accusation turns out to be true. Conversely, a proven manipulation that is promptly detected, credibly investigated, and fairly adjudicated can demonstrate that the control environment works — and limit rather than expand the event's impact. The event and the organization's response to it are separable, and treating them as the same thing is the most common error in how integrity incidents get discussed.

This review asks a different question than a rules or disciplinary review would: what does the evidence show about the nature of this risk, the effectiveness and credibility of the existing control environment, and whether the residual exposure is one the organizations should be comfortable carrying as-is? It does not prescribe a particular integrity function, organizational structure, or technology. Governance is presented as the output of that assessment, not its starting premise.

The idea this review keeps returning to is a single one: **competition integrity can be impaired because a competition was manipulated, or because constituents cannot reasonably rely on the system used to determine whether it was manipulated.** The first is primarily a participant/event risk. The second is primarily a control-system risk. The evidence below shows examples of each, separately, and they should be evaluated separately.

A brief note on method: this review is organized using a standard enterprise-risk framework (COSO) to keep the analysis disciplined — starting from what could affect the organization’s objectives, rather than starting from a list of incidents. The mechanics of that framework are kept out of the main text and are available in Appendix B for readers who want them.

Scope, Methodology & Limitations

Scope. This review covers professional U.S. tournament bass fishing, with selected adjacent freshwater tournament-fishing cases (noted as such where used) included because they show a manipulation typology relevant to bass fishing specifically.

Purpose. This is a risk and governance analysis. It is not an adjudication of any individual case, and it does not reach conclusions about the guilt, innocence, or credibility of any named individual beyond what the cited governing bodies, courts, or public records have themselves established.

Evidence standard. This review draws on public governing-body statements and rules, court and law-enforcement records, publicly reported facts, and existing academic and industry research on sport-integrity governance. Where a proposition rests on a governing body’s own characterization, a competitor’s disputed account, or external reporting rather than an adjudicated fact, this review says so.

Limitations. This review relies on public-source material; it has no access to confidential investigative files. It does not attempt to estimate industry-wide manipulation prevalence, and nothing in it should be read as a conclusion regarding any unproven individual allegation. It is not a legal opinion, and specific legal or statutory applicability discussed below would require event-specific legal analysis.

Independence. This report is independent work by Jim Brown. It was not prepared on behalf of, sponsored by, endorsed by, or reviewed by any third party, and the views expressed are his own. It uses no confidential information, client information, proprietary methods or nonpublic information. All references rely solely on publicly available information obtained through public sources.

The Core Distinction: Actual vs. Perceived Integrity Failure

A rules violation is not automatically a risk the board needs to know about. It becomes one when the event, the possibility of recurrence, or the organization’s response to it could affect competitor confidence, sponsor relationships, audience trust, legal exposure, or the sport’s broader commercial standing. That threshold — real consequence to the organization, not the mere occurrence of misconduct — is the test this review applies throughout, and it is why this review defines the risk broadly:

Competition Integrity Risk is the risk that the actual or perceived fairness, authenticity, reliability, or credibility of professional fishing competition or its results is compromised, causing harm to competitors or reducing constituent confidence in the competition, its governance, or the organization responsible for it.

The phrase *actual or perceived* is the central idea in this review. A competition can experience real consequences through either of two distinct paths.

Path A — Actual Manipulation. Manipulation occurs → the competitive result is improperly influenced → competitors may be harmed → prize, ranking, qualification, commercial, legal, or reputational consequences may follow.

Path B — Credibility Failure, Independent of Whether Manipulation Occurred. An allegation or anomalous event occurs → detection produces an uncertain or contested result → investigation fails to establish facts convincingly → adjudication appears inconsistent, opaque, or insufficiently supported → constituents cannot reasonably determine whether a result was legitimate, or lose confidence in the process used to establish its legitimacy → confidence may decline whether or not manipulation is ever established.

Two Paths to Enterprise Consequence

PATH A — Actual Manipulation



PATH B — Credibility Failure (independent of whether manipulation occurred)



Both paths can produce real enterprise consequences, whether or not manipulation is ever established.

Figure 1. Two paths through which competition integrity can be impaired.

Path B does not presume that any underlying accusation is true or false. It identifies a distinct exposure: an organization's inability to produce a sufficiently credible answer to the question of whether manipulation occurred is itself a source of risk, separate from whatever the ultimate factual answer turns out to be. This is why Competition Integrity Risk cannot be reduced to "the risk that someone cheats" — it also includes the risk that the organization cannot credibly determine whether someone cheated.

One clarification worth stating up front: a manipulated catch should not be classified simply as "reputational risk." The chain runs from the event itself through sporting, financial, competitor, operational, legal, and commercial consequences before it reaches reputation — reputational damage is typically a downstream *consequence*, not the originating risk. Collapsing the two makes it harder to diagnose what actually needs to change. The trigger is the sporting risk itself — the direct impairment of the competitive result; the financial, competitor, operational, legal, and commercial items are what that impairment can go on to cause, not what causes it.

Why This Warrants Review Now

Sound risk management asks two separate questions about any risk: how likely is it to occur, and how consequential would it be if it did. This review does not conclude that the underlying likelihood of manipulation across the industry has increased — the evidence below does not support an industry-wide likelihood estimate in either direction. What has changed, and changed verifiably, is the second question: how much now rides on the same underlying risk, because of the sport's recent commercial growth.

That growth shows up along four fronts: audience reach, prize pools and payouts, sponsorship exposure, and commercial complexity.

- **Audience reach:** B.A.S.S. reported a 20 percent increase in live viewership in 2025 over an already record-setting 2024, and projected its expanded broadcast agreement would deliver more than 20 million viewers.² Its 2026 schedule includes 12 hours of live coverage on FOX broadcast television — part of a distribution footprint reaching more than 200 million U.S. households — plus nearly 60 additional hours of weekend coverage on FS1.¹
- **Prize pools and payouts:** B.A.S.S. reported combined Elite Series and Bassmaster Classic payout investment exceeding \$4.1 million for 2025;³ MLF's 2026 REDCREST championship carried a \$700,000 purse with a \$300,000 winner's payout;⁴ and a new October 2026 event, The Champions — organized independently by World Bass Enterprises, not by B.A.S.S. or MLF directly — was

originally announced in February 2026 with a purse of more than \$3 million;⁵ World Bass Enterprises’ current materials list a total purse of \$3.25 million, including a \$1.25 million first-place prize marketed as the largest single payout in the sport’s history.⁶

- **Sponsorship exposure:** MLF’s 2026 Bass Pro Tour sponsor roster includes Bass Pro Shops, Mercury, O’Reilly Auto Parts, Suzuki Marine, and Toyota, among numerous other brands, attached to a sport reaching broadcast audiences it has not reached before.⁴⁴
- **Commercial complexity:** World Bass Enterprises’ launch of The Champions in 2026 is explicitly aimed, in its own description, at unifying the sport’s two leading tours, whose top competitors had not previously had a mechanism to compete head-to-head⁷ — a sign of a commercial structure evolving quickly, with more organizations and more capital now attached to the same underlying integrity risk.




Figure 2. Selected 2025–2026 prize investment across major bass-fishing events.

The point here is narrow and should not be overstated: **commercial growth increases the consequence severity of an integrity failure even if the underlying probability of misconduct has not changed.** Higher prize pools, larger audiences, and more sponsor exposure do not make manipulation more likely on their own; they make the fallout bigger if a failure — of either the manipulation-prevention kind or the credibility kind — occurs. That distinction between likelihood and consequence severity is maintained throughout this review.

Hypothesis, unverified: commercial growth may also raise likelihood, not only consequence severity, by shifting the incentive structure a competitor weighs before manipulating a result — higher stakes increasing the reward side of that calculation. No bass-fishing-specific evidence tests this directly; the closest available reference point is anecdotal, drawn from broader collegiate-sports experience, and is not treated as established in this review’s findings.

What Existing Controls Already Do

Professional bass fishing is not operating without integrity controls, and any honest assessment has to credit what already exists before asking what might be missing. Current controls span the standard range: formal rules and codes of conduct that prohibit manipulation and require honest reporting;^{8 45} in-boat officials, weigh-in inspection, live-scoring systems, and truth-verification procedures used by certain organizations to detect problems;⁹ tournament-director review, outside investigators, and independent-examiner appeal processes to investigate disputes;¹⁰ and disqualification, forfeiture, suspension, and future-event exclusion to correct confirmed violations. These controls visibly worked as intended in several of the cases discussed below. The open question this review raises is narrower than “do controls exist” — it is whether they are calibrated to the specific risks the evidence reveals, particularly around how much weight a single detection tool should carry in a consequential decision. (The full breakdown of these controls, and the taxonomy mechanics behind how this review classifies and tests them, is in Appendix B.)

What the Evidence Shows

Manipulation Cases as Threat Intelligence

The cases in this section are not presented as evidence that deliberate catch manipulation has occurred within the major professional bass tours. They are adjacent competitive freshwater tournament-fishing cases, used because they demonstrate realized manipulation typologies directly relevant to professional bass fishing. Their evidentiary value is therefore threat identification and control analysis, not an estimate of manipulation prevalence within B.A.S.S., MLF, NPFL, or any other professional-tour organization. None of the five cases below occurred within a B.A.S.S., MLF, or NPFL professional-tour event; each is drawn from an independent, open-entry, or local-club tournament, identified specifically below. These cases establish that deliberate catch-manipulation methods are feasible and have actually occurred in competitive freshwater tournament fishing; the next section examines detection and adjudication

evidence drawn specifically from B.A.S.S. and MLF professional-tour competition; and the commercial exposure described above explains why both sets of findings matter at the professional-tour level even though these particular cases did not occur there.

Lake Erie Walleye Trail (2022). This is a freshwater tournament-fishing case involving walleye on an independent walleye tournament circuit, not a professional bass-fishing event, and is included as a comparator because the manipulation typology is directly relevant. Per public reporting and court records, competitors inserted lead weights and fish fillets into tournament fish; both pleaded guilty to felony charges,¹¹ served jail time, forfeited a boat, and paid fines.¹² Classification: deliberate insertion of foreign material into a competition catch to inflate weight. This is unequivocal evidence — established through guilty pleas and convictions — that deliberate catch manipulation of this type is a realized risk, not a hypothetical. The control story is mixed: prevention was circumvented, but weigh-in anomaly detection, physical inspection, and the disciplinary and legal response operated as designed.

Lake Fork tail-trimming case (2018/2019). According to public reporting and the underlying indictment, an angler competing in Sealy Outdoors' Big Bass Splash — an independent, open-entry tournament series, not a B.A.S.S./MLF/NPFL event — allegedly trimmed a bass's tail to bring it within Lake Fork's legal slot limit and qualify for prizes; a grand jury indicted him on a tournament-fraud charge.¹³ This case shows manipulation is not confined to weight: the target here was the eligibility criterion itself. The indictment is established; this review did not locate a subsequent conviction or acquittal, and no final disposition should be assumed.

Lake Fork weighted-bass case (March 2026). In a separate, later Lake Fork incident at the Lake Fork Lure Co. Tournament — again an independent tournament, not a B.A.S.S./MLF/NPFL event — Texas Parks and Wildlife wardens found three three-quarter-ounce lead weights concealed inside a largemouth bass entered into competition, with matching weights reportedly found in the angler's boat. The angler, Curtis Lee Daniels, was arrested and charged with third-degree felony fraud in fishing tournaments.¹⁴ Same typology as Lake Erie and Toledo Bend (below), independently manifested at the same body of water on a separate occasion. As of the evidence reviewed, this is a charge, not a conviction.

Toledo Bend (May 2024). At Sealy Outdoors' Big Bass Splash — an independent tournament, not a B.A.S.S./MLF/NPFL event — tournament personnel grew suspicious of a 6.69-pound bass; officials determined it contained 2.59 pounds of lead weights (a 39 percent weight increase), and the angler fled the scene before being charged with fishing contest fraud.¹⁵ This is a charge, not an established conviction.

Calumet River (May 2024). According to the Illinois Department of Natural Resources, conservation police received information that an angler, David Moore, had hidden fish on a stringer in the Calumet River the night before a Cal Sag Bass Anglers tournament — a local club tournament, not a B.A.S.S./MLF/NPFL event.¹⁶ The following morning, officers observed Moore retrieve four smallmouth bass from the stringer and place them in his boat’s live well before the tournament began. Moore was cited for attempted theft and related violations.¹⁶ This targets catch *provenance* rather than catch *authenticity* — a different threat vector from the weight-manipulation cases above, since standard weigh-in controls can verify a fish’s characteristics but cannot, on their own, establish provenance. This is a citation, not an established conviction.

Reading the cluster together. Counting Lake Erie, the Lake Fork weighted-bass case, and Toledo Bend, there are three independent, geographically separate instances of essentially the same artificial-weight-enhancement method, plus a fourth manipulation method (Lake Fork tail-trimming) targeting eligibility rather than weight, plus a fifth targeting provenance (Calumet River). Each of the three weight-enhancement detections appears, from public reporting, to have been initially triggered by a person noticing that a fish did not look like it should weigh that much — which demonstrates the importance of experienced personnel within the existing control environment, but does not by itself establish how consistently the same anomaly would be detected across events, personnel, or less obvious manifestations of the same method. A manipulation method appearing independently across multiple, unrelated events warrants treatment as a recognized threat, even though each individual incident may be isolated on its own facts. This is evidence that the risk is real and that a particular method is replicable — it is not, on its own, evidence that the underlying probability of manipulation industry-wide is rising.

Detection and Adjudication Cases as Control-Effectiveness and Credibility Evidence

The following cases are evidence about the reliability and credibility of the mechanisms used to determine whether manipulation occurred, and are not evidence about whether it did. They should not be read as additional examples of proven manipulation, and this review does not reach a conclusion about the underlying accusation in either case beyond what the relevant governing body has itself stated.

Bassmaster Elite Series, JT Thompkins (2024). According to B.A.S.S.’s public statement, a rookie angler was disqualified after failing to pass polygraph sections concerning prohibited acquisition of nonpublic fishing locations and use of online or social-media information for competitive advantage.¹⁷ According to public reporting, he subsequently disputed the finding.¹⁸ Absent independent corroboration, the

polygraph result should not be treated analytically as equivalent to independently established manipulation. This case is better evidence of potential limitations in this particular process's evidentiary sufficiency than a straightforward instance of proven manipulation.

Bassmaster Elite Series, David Mullins (April 2026). According to B.A.S.S.'s own public statement, Mullins was randomly selected for routine screening, was "unable to pass" his initial examination, appealed under established procedures, underwent a subsequent examination with an independent Bassmaster-approved examiner, and passed; B.A.S.S. has also stated publicly that failing an initial examination does not necessarily mean foul play.¹⁹ B.A.S.S. reasonably characterizes the outcome as evidence its appeal mechanism worked as designed — a conclusion this review does not dispute. The separate question this review raises is why two examinations of the same underlying conduct produced materially different results, which does not establish that either examiner was wrong. It does identify measurement uncertainty in this particular truth-verification process as used here. The defensible conclusion is neither "the polygraph failed" nor "the appeal proves the system works perfectly." It is that materially different output from successive applications of the same screening tool tells management something specific about that tool's measurement uncertainty as a screening input, and that a secondary control may be advisable before an adverse competitive determination substantially dependent on it is treated as sufficiently reliable on its own. The National Research Council's comprehensive review of polygraph science distinguished specific-incident examinations from screening applications, and found the scientific evidence for screening applications materially more limited and uncertain than for specific-incident testing²⁰ — relevant here because the Mullins examination arose from routine per-event screening, while the Martin/O'Connell examination below followed a specific protest and allegation, a different and better-evidenced application of the same general tool. This review does not conclude that polygraphs are unreliable generally, that a non-pass proves nothing, or that either examination discussed here was scientifically invalid; the point is narrower — screening and specific-incident applications carry different degrees of scientific uncertainty, and that difference is relevant to how much weight either application should carry in an adverse competitive determination.

MLF Bass Fishing League, Aspen Martin / Matt O'Connell (2025). According to MLF's public statement, Martin was initially disqualified after a polygraph indicated deception.²¹ Martin subsequently produced text messages that supported his account that he did not provide the fishing information O'Connell had allegedly requested. Martin then underwent a second examination by an independent examiner mutually

agreed upon by MLF and Martin, which indicated no deception; MLF reinstated him and restored his winnings, but fined him for failing to report O’Connell’s alleged violation, and O’Connell was suspended from MLF competition through 2026, with eligibility to reapply in 2027.²² The documentary evidence is what makes this case exceptionally informative: independent, objective evidence resolved ambiguity that a single contested exam could not resolve on its own — suggestive of an evidentiary hierarchy worth evaluating (running roughly from objective physical/digital evidence, through records and independent witness evidence, to credibility-assessment tools and unsupported allegation), though one case does not establish an industry-wide standard, and any such ordering would need further legal and procedural validation before adoption.

Case Evidence Timeline, 2018–2026




Figure 3. Case evidence timeline, 2018–2026, showing the two evidentiary clusters discussed above.

The Bottom Line

The aggregated evidence does not establish institutional corruption, widespread competitor manipulation, systemic failure of professional tournament organizations, or that any one detection technology is inherently invalid. It does establish two related but distinct risks worth tracking side by side:

Competition Manipulation Risk — participants may intentionally manipulate catches, information, performance, scoring, or another competition variable to obtain improper advantage. The manipulation cases above are evidence primarily about this risk.

Integrity Control Effectiveness and Credibility Risk — the mechanisms used to prevent, detect, investigate, establish, and adjudicate suspected misconduct may fail to identify actual misconduct, may generate unreliable adverse determinations, or may lack sufficient evidentiary or procedural credibility to sustain constituent confidence, whether or not any given determination is ultimately correct. The detection and adjudication cases above are evidence primarily about this risk.

The manipulation cases establish that the risk is real rather than hypothetical, that a specific typology (artificial weight enhancement) has recurred independently across multiple events, and that the method appears replicable. They do not, on their own, establish that the underlying probability of manipulation industry-wide is increasing. Existing controls — the preventive, detective, investigative, and corrective mechanisms described above — visibly operated as designed in several of these cases. The detection and adjudication cases suggest that a significant truth-verification control used by certain major tournament organizations, in the specific cases examined here, carries measurement uncertainty when used as a substantial input to a decision without independent corroboration — a finding scoped to the cases examined, not generalized across the industry.

None of this is settled by issuing a sanction. A disqualification corrects the standings but can leave unresolved: uncertainty about previous results, litigation exposure, competitor distrust, sponsor concern, questions about investigation credibility, and reputational consequences, along with the open question of whether the same threat remains replicable. **Enforcement is not equivalent to integrity risk management.** Nor does a single integrity event stay contained to one part of the business — it can move from operational interruption, to financial exposure (prize recovery), to legal or regulatory exposure, to sponsor concern, to public controversy, to a broader dent in confidence in the competitive product. That correlated spread — not the severity of any single incident alone — is why this belongs on the board’s radar alongside the organization’s other principal risks. (The full residual-risk, appetite, and target-risk mechanics behind this conclusion are in Appendix B.)

Where This Risk Sits in the Enterprise

Competition Integrity does not exist in isolation from the rest of the enterprise. This review treats it as a standalone top-level risk category — not folded into general “strategic risk” — because authenticity of competition is part of the underlying product in professional sport, and integrity events can spread simultaneously into financial, legal, operational, commercial, and reputational consequences, as shown above.

The Ten Enterprise Risk Domains Competition Integrity as a Standalone Category




Figure 4. The ten enterprise risk domains, with Competition Integrity as a standalone category.

Within Competition Integrity, this review distinguishes several categories: manipulation of the catch, of performance or results, or through collusion; misuse of competitive information; conventional rules and scoring violations; wagering-linked risk where applicable; and — deliberately given equal weight — the reliability of officiating, investigation, and adjudication itself. That last category is expanded beyond a conventional integrity taxonomy because the evidence above indicates that the control architecture, not only participant conduct, is part of the sport's risk profile. A full breakdown of this taxonomy down to specific risk scenarios is in Appendix A, for readers who want that level of detail; most readers can skip it.

Monitoring, Ownership & Escalation

An integrity function monitoring this risk on an ongoing basis — rather than waiting for the next incident — would track a small set of indicators over time: allegations and substantiated violations per event, repeat violations, time from report to investigation to adjudication, appeal or reversal rates, and detection results later contradicted by corroborating evidence. The point isn't to generate a large dashboard; it's to see whether things are moving toward or away from acceptable before the next incident forces the question. Which indicators, at what thresholds, and owned by whom, are decisions for the organization; this review identifies the risk, not the playbook.

Ownership should be clear and layered: the tournament director or officiating structure owns individual-event rule application; a designated integrity risk owner (whatever structure the organization settles on) owns the pattern across events; executive management owns the judgment of whether residual risk is acceptable and authorizes responses; and the board's role is oversight of whether the risk is appropriately identified, owned, controlled, and monitored — not acting as investigator or disciplinary body itself. Not every rules violation needs to reach the board; what does is evidence that this risk, in aggregate, may be running higher than the organization is comfortable with, or that a control-effectiveness or credibility finding has broader implications. Each material incident should feed back into the monitoring above — informing whether typologies, controls, or training need updating — rather than disappearing into a closed disciplinary file once a sanction is issued.

Governance Response Options

Only after completing the risk assessment above does this review turn to governance models — deliberately, because the sequence matters. The logic is not *other sports created integrity units, so bass fishing should consider something similar*. It is: risk identified → controls recognized → control effectiveness and credibility assessed → gap, if any, identified → response options evaluated against that specific gap.

Model	Principal Advantage	Principal Limitation	Relative Cost
Maintain Existing Structure / Targeted Control Enhancement	Lowest burden and cost; preserves current ownership; appropriate if residual risk is already acceptable	May not address identified capability, independence, or consistency gaps if those prove material	Lowest / incremental

Model	Principal Advantage	Principal Limitation	Relative Cost
Internal Compliance Function	Low cost, fast to stand up	Shares the conflict-of-interest structure that independent models are designed to avoid	Low
Independent Committee	Separates adjudication without a new permanent position	Continuity depends on committee stability	Variable, case-based
Shared Outsourced Service	Specialist expertise, shareable across organizations	Less day-to-day proximity to competitors and events	Moderate
Dedicated Internal Integrity Function	Continuous ownership, deepest institutional knowledge	Most exposed to “integrity washing” risk if under-resourced	Highest

The first option is included deliberately: a genuine review must be able to conclude that no structural change is warranted, if the evidence supports that conclusion. Where a dedicated internal function is among the options a board evaluates, its appropriate level — executive, director, manager, or committee — is an implementation question that follows scope and resourcing analysis, not a predetermined design choice.

No model is presented here as the answer. Whichever a board considers, “independent” should mean something specific rather than aspirational: procedurally insulated so findings cannot be altered by management, and resourced adequately enough to function rather than merely to exist. A cross-organization structure serving B.A.S.S., MLF, and the NPFL jointly, under any of the models above, raises additional governance questions regardless of which model is chosen: who employs and directs the function, how findings are shared across organizations, and how disagreements between organizations would be resolved.

Governance Response Options, Ordered by Relative Cost

Relative cost / burden →




Figure 5. Governance response options ordered by relative cost and burden.

Comparative Sports Governance

The purpose of this section is not to establish that bass fishing ought to follow other sports' precedent. It answers a narrower question, appropriate only once an organization has determined that residual integrity risk warrants additional treatment: *what governance structures have other sports used, under what circumstances, and with what advantages and limitations?*

FIFA and the Olympic movement faced institutional corruption and state-level manipulation — governance failures inside the organizations themselves. Cricket and tennis faced a narrower problem closer to bass fishing's current evidence base: individual competitors and associates manipulating outcomes, addressed through a dedicated function built for that purpose.

Federation	Trigger	Year	Response
FIFA	2015 DOJ indictment of 14 defendants for racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering (World Cup hosting/media rights) ²⁵	2015–2016	Governance reform: term limits, separation of political/management functions, expanded-mandate Ethics Committee ²⁶

Federation	Trigger	Year	Response
Olympic Movement (IOC/WADA)	McLaren Report (Parts I and II, July and December 2016) confirming Russian state-directed manipulation of doping controls ²⁸	2016–2017	International Testing Agency (ITA) established as an operationally separate testing body ²⁹
Cricket (ICC)	Hansie Cronje match-fixing affair ³⁰	2000	Anti-Corruption and Security Unit created (director appointed June 2000); now operating as the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), housed within ICC governance ³¹
Tennis (TIU → ITIA)	January 2016 BBC/BuzzFeed investigation into an unsanctioned player network suspected of match-fixing ³³	2016–2018	Independent Review Panel (interim report April 2018; final report December 2018) found the existing Tennis Integrity Unit (est. 2008) ³² insufficiently resourced and reached; ^{34 35} TIU subsequently reorganized into the International Tennis Integrity Agency (ITIA) ³⁶
World Athletics (AIU)	Lamine Diack corruption affair ³⁸	2017	Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) established, operational April 2017, structurally independent of World Athletics ³⁷
International Biathlon Union	Doping/corruption allegations against former IBU leadership ³⁹	2019	Biathlon Integrity Unit (BIU) created — operationally independent, structurally part of the IBU ⁴⁰

These cases point to one structural principle worth stating precisely: when the organization commercially responsible for a sport is also the organization investigating threats to that sport’s competitive legitimacy, independence in how those threats are investigated and adjudicated is a factor worth weighing — a practical safeguard against the appearance and the reality of conflicted oversight, not a presumption that independence is required in every case. Research on federation governance identifies

external legitimacy pressure, rather than proactive risk management, as a primary driver behind reforms of this kind across federations generally.

Comparative Sports Governance: Scandal-to-Reform Timeline




Figure 6. Comparative sports governance: scandal-to-reform timeline.

That principle also cautions against assuming any given reform achieves genuine independence simply because it was announced as such. FIFA’s 2016 reforms are a useful illustration: even after the Ethics Committee’s mandate was expanded, FIFA President Gianni Infantino was reported in 2017 to have attempted to influence the committee’s leadership — a documented episode that raised questions about whether the reformed structure had achieved durable independence from the organization it was meant to oversee.²⁷ Cricket’s Anti-Corruption Unit offers a related caution from a different angle: it has operated for over two decades and is led by experienced investigators, but it remains housed within ICC’s own governance structure rather than externally separated, and independent commentary has criticized it at times as under-resourced relative to the scale of the threat it addresses.³¹

Many post-scandal integrity reforms are found, on closer study, to function as symbolic gestures rather than substantively resourced institutions. Verschuuren (2021), studying reporting mechanisms adopted by international sport organizations, found that the pursuit of external legitimacy was a key driver behind such reforms, that minimal resources were typically invested in implementing them, and that their perceived impact was limited — a dynamic he terms “integrity washing.”⁴¹ Later scholarship has engaged with related integrity-governance concerns.⁴²

A framework adopted for appearance, without real independence, investigative authority, and resourcing behind it, would carry the risk without the benefit.

Modern cricket and tennis integrity functions employ multiple information, intelligence, investigative, and evidentiary sources rather than depending on a single form of detection or credibility assessment — the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Unit and the International Tennis Integrity Agency’s investigative functions both combine testimony, documentary evidence, and analytical monitoring. Where a board concludes additional treatment is warranted, elements other federations have used along these lines — multi-source verification; formalized disciplinary and appeals architecture; standing competitor education and reporting protocols, including reporting obligations that may apply to tournament organizers under Texas law where the statutory prerequisites of Texas Parks and Wildlife Code §66.023 are satisfied;²³ and ongoing risk reporting to the board as a standing governance matter rather than an ad hoc response to the next incident — offer a starting menu rather than a fixed prescription.

“MLF’s stance is simple — a polygraph is one tool in our integrity process, never the automatic final word.” — Boyd Duckett, MLF President and CEO⁴³

That framing is consistent with the evidentiary approach identified above — the open question is less whether the principle is accepted, and more whether it is applied consistently and built into a standing process rather than decided case by case.

Closing Observations

Professional bass fishing already employs meaningful competition-integrity controls. The presence of manipulation incidents does not by itself demonstrate that those controls are ineffective, and disputed or reversed detection outcomes do not by themselves establish that the underlying systems are unsound. They do, however, provide information that boards and management can use to test the industry’s assumptions about this risk.

The central question this review poses is therefore not whether professional bass fishing has a cheating problem, nor whether it needs to replicate the integrity structures of another sport. It is: *does the available evidence indicate that the nature of this risk has changed, that existing controls are less effective or less credible than assumed, or that the residual exposure is more than the organization should be comfortable carrying?* If the answer is no, existing controls may remain appropriate as they stand. If the answer is yes, management should determine which specific risk or control deficiency creates the gap and select a proportionate response from among the options above.

That is the governance decision, and it is a materially different proposition from beginning with a desired integrity structure and searching for evidence to justify it.

Appendix A: Full Professional Bass Fishing Enterprise Risk Taxonomy (L1–L5)

This appendix presents the complete industry-level reference taxonomy underlying this review’s analysis, built as a reference for a professional bass-fishing sanctioning body or tournament operator generally rather than for any one organization. It is a technical reference; most readers can skip it and rely on the summary in the body above.

The taxonomy uses five consistent levels: **L1 — Enterprise Risk Domain; L2 — Risk Category; L3 — Risk Type; L4 — Risk Typology / Method / Exposure; L5 — Standardized Risk Event / Scenario.** L5 scenarios are standardized event families, not a catalog of every conceivable factual incident, and an actual case (such as the incidents examined above) sits beneath L5 as an instance of it, not as an additional taxonomy level. Except where a scenario restates a case already established in this review’s body, the L5 scenarios below are hypothetical illustrations of the typology, not new factual claims about any named organization or individual. Drivers/causes, controls, and consequences are related concepts that sit outside this taxonomy and are addressed separately in Appendix B; they are not themselves L3, L4, or L5 entries.

This taxonomy is a reference set, not a playbook. It classifies what could go wrong for a professional bass-fishing organization; it does not name the indicators, thresholds or owners any particular organization should adopt, because those are derived from that organization’s own decisions, appetite and data, which a public-source review cannot supply. The small set of indicators an organization would track, and who would own them, are discussed in “Monitoring, Ownership & Escalation.”

A.1 Strategic & Business Model Risk

Risks capable of impairing the organization’s strategy, competitive position, relevance, economic model, or long-term viability.

L2 — Industry & Market Risk - L3: Participation Demand — L4: declining competitor participation, aging participant base — L5: sustained decline in new-competitor entry reduces field size below viable event thresholds. - L3: Fan/Audience Demand — L4: audience erosion, competing entertainment alternatives — L5: viewership declines materially across a broadcast season. - L3: Competitive Landscape — L4: rival-organization capture of competitors or sponsors — L5: a competing tour or organization draws a material share of top competitors or anchor sponsors away from an existing organization.

L2 — Strategic Execution Risk - L3: Strategy Selection — L4: misaligned strategic bets — L5: a chosen strategic direction fails to achieve its stated commercial or competitive objective. - L3: Investment Allocation — L4: capital misallocation — L5: a major strategic investment (broadcast expansion, new event format) fails to produce expected value. - L3: Growth/Transformation Execution — L4: execution capacity shortfall — L5: organizational expansion materially exceeds existing operational or governance capacity.

L2 — Commercial Model Risk - L3: Sponsorship Model — L4: sponsor concentration, activation shortfall — L5: loss of an anchor sponsor materially reduces revenue. - L3: Media/Content Monetization — L4: rights-value erosion — L5: a media or streaming agreement renews at materially reduced value. - L3: Entry-Fee and Membership Economics — L4: pricing/participation mismatch — L5: entry-fee structure materially suppresses field size or revenue.

L2 — Constituent Confidence Risk - L3: Competitor Confidence — L4: erosion of competitor trust in governance — L5: competitors materially reduce participation citing loss of confidence in the organization. - L3: Sponsor/Fan Confidence — L4: erosion of commercial-partner or audience trust — L5: a sponsor or media partner conditions renewal on governance changes.

A.2 Competition Integrity Risk

L2 — Competition Manipulation

L3 — Catch Manipulation

L4 typologies: fish procurement/planting; fish substitution; fish transfer; catch-attribution manipulation; catch-weight manipulation; artificial weight enhancement; physical alteration of fish; fraudulent catch reporting; catch-provenance manipulation.

L5 standardized scenarios: - A competitor introduces a fish obtained before or outside the authorized competition process. - A competitor presents another person's catch as his or her own. - A competitor deliberately inserts foreign material into a fish to increase its recorded weight (illustrated in the body by the Lake Erie and Toledo Bend cases, and the Lake Fork weighted-bass case).^{12 15 14} - A competitor deliberately alters fish length or condition to create eligibility (illustrated by the Lake Fork tail-trimming case).¹³ - A competitor knowingly reports a false catch or weight. - A competitor stages or prepositions fish for later retrieval during competition (illustrated by the Calumet River case).¹⁶

L3 — Performance / Result Manipulation

L4: intentional underperformance; deliberate placement manipulation; result manipulation benefiting another participant; coordinated outcome manipulation.

L5: a competitor intentionally alters performance to affect a competitive outcome; a competitor deliberately sacrifices placement or points for an improper purpose; multiple participants coordinate conduct to distort standings or qualification.

L3 — Collusion

L4: competitor-to-competitor; competitor-to-official; competitor-to-third-party; team/affiliate collusion.

L5: competitors coordinate prohibited conduct to influence results; an official knowingly assists a competitor in obtaining an improper competitive advantage; a third party assists in manipulation of catch, information, or result.

L2 — Information Integrity

L3 — Unauthorized Competitive Information

L4: waypoint acquisition; location intelligence; pattern/fish information; unauthorized scouting.

L5: a competitor receives prohibited waypoint or location information; a third party scouts tournament waters for a competitor contrary to applicable rules.

L3 — Inside Information

L4: confidential event information; competitor information; operational information; nonpublic enforcement information.

L5: an insider improperly provides confidential competitive or operational information to a participant.

L3 — Digital Information Abuse

L4: live-stream exploitation; tracking-data exploitation; social-media intelligence; unauthorized electronic communication.

L5: a competitor accesses or receives prohibited live-event information during competition; a competitor uses social media contrary to competitive-information rules.

L2 — Rules & Sporting Integrity

L3 — Eligibility Integrity — L4: false eligibility claim, ineligible participation — L5: a competitor participates while not meeting eligibility requirements.

L3 — Equipment Compliance — L4: unauthorized tackle, prohibited technology — L5: a competitor uses equipment prohibited by tournament rules to gain advantage.

L3 — Fishing-Method Compliance — L4: prohibited fishing method — L5: a competitor uses a method excluded by tournament rules.

L3 — Boundary/Off-Limits Compliance — L4: boundary violation, off-limits-period violation — L5: a competitor fishes outside permitted tournament waters or during a designated off-limits period.

L3 — Timing Compliance — L4: late/early check-in or weigh-in — L5: a competitor presents a catch outside the permitted competition window.

L3 — Practice Compliance — L4: prohibited pre-tournament practice — L5: a competitor practices in violation of practice-period restrictions.

L3 — Sportsmanship/Conduct — L4: conduct violation, interference with another competitor — L5: a competitor's conduct toward another competitor or official violates code-of-conduct provisions.

L2 — Scoring & Results Integrity

L3 — Weighing Integrity — L4: scale manipulation, weigh-in procedural error — L5: an official or participant intentionally alters or improperly influences recorded weight.

L3 — Score Recording — L4: incorrect weight entry, transcription error — L5: a scoring error materially changes standings.

L3 — Leaderboard Integrity — L4: data-synchronization failure, display error — L5: a leaderboard displays materially inaccurate standings during competition.

L3 — Results Certification — L4: certification error, premature certification — L5: results are certified using materially inaccurate data.

L3 — Points/Qualification Calculations — L4: calculation error, misapplied qualification formula — L5: a competitor's qualification status is determined using an incorrect calculation.

L2 — Wagering & Betting Integrity (Where Applicable)

This category applies only where regulated or unregulated wagering activity intersects with a given competition; this review does not assume that regulated wagering currently exists across all professional bass-fishing competitions.

L3 — Participant Wagering — L4: direct participant betting, proxy betting — L5: a competitor wagers, directly or through a proxy, on an event in which they compete.

L3 — Insider Wagering / Information Misuse — L4: transfer of nonpublic information to bettors — L5: a participant or insider provides nonpublic competitive information to a bettor.

L3 — Betting-Linked Manipulation — L4: manipulation for wagering benefit — L5: a competition outcome is manipulated for the purpose of benefiting a wager.

L3 — Suspicious Wagering Activity — L4: anomalous betting pattern — L5: a betting pattern inconsistent with normal market behavior triggers integrity review.

L2 — Officiating, Investigation & Adjudication Integrity

This branch supports the actual-versus-perceived integrity distinction central to this review.

L3 — Official Independence — L4: undisclosed conflict of interest — L5: a material conflict affecting an integrity decision is not disclosed.

L3 — Enforcement Consistency — L4: inconsistent sanctioning, biased enforcement — L5: similar violations receive materially inconsistent sanctions without a defensible rationale.

L3 — Investigative Integrity — L4: improper investigative interference — L5: an investigation is materially influenced by a party with an interest in its outcome.

L3 — Evidence Integrity — L4: evidence loss or mishandling — L5: evidence relevant to a disciplinary proceeding is lost, suppressed, or mishandled.

L3 — Truth-Verification/Credibility-Assessment Reliability — L4: overreliance on a single contested evidentiary input, failure to corroborate a material adverse determination — L5: a consequential adverse determination materially dependent on a credibility-assessment tool is reached without appropriate secondary verification (a category discussed generally, and not asserted as established fact, in relation to the Thompkins and Mullins cases above).

L3 — Disciplinary Consistency — L4: unexplained departure from established procedure — L5: a disciplinary outcome departs from prior precedent without a stated basis.

L3 — Appeals/Procedural Fairness — L4: inadequate appeal mechanism — L5: an appeal process fails to provide meaningful independent review.

L3 — Decision Transparency/Explainability — L4: insufficiently explained adverse determination — L5: an affected competitor or the public cannot ascertain the basis for a consequential integrity decision.

These are risk scenarios illustrating the category, not assertions that any named organization has committed them; the specific cases discussed in this review's body are qualified there.

A.3 Operational Risk

L2 — Tournament Operations — L3: event execution; launch/check-in operations; weigh-in operations; scheduling — L4: procedural breakdown, staffing shortfall at a critical operational step — L5: an operational breakdown at launch, check-in, or weigh-in materially disrupts a scheduled tournament.

L2 — Safety Risk — L3: boating safety; weather-related safety; competitor/official/spectator safety — L4: inadequate safety protocol, severe-weather exposure during competition — L5: a serious boating accident or weather-related incident occurs during competition.

L2 — Business Continuity — L3: event interruption; facility failure; communications failure — L4: single point of failure in critical infrastructure — L5: a tournament cannot continue because critical infrastructure or communications become unavailable.

L2 — Third-Party Risk — L3: vendor risk; contractor risk; host-venue risk; technology-supplier risk — L4: critical vendor non-performance — L5: failure of a critical third-party service provider disrupts a scheduled event.

A.4 Financial Risk

L2 — Revenue Risk — L3: sponsorship revenue; entry-fee revenue; media revenue — L4: revenue-source concentration — L5: a material revenue source terminates or declines materially within a fiscal period.

L2 — Liquidity & Capital Risk — L3: working-capital risk; financing risk — L4: cash-flow timing mismatch — L5: insufficient liquidity to fund scheduled operations or prize obligations.

L2 — Financial Reporting Risk — L3: revenue recognition; expense recognition; prize-liability accounting — L4: misstatement risk — L5: a material financial reporting error affects reported results.

L2 — Fraud & Asset Misappropriation — L3: employee fraud; vendor fraud; payment fraud — L4: control-circumvention opportunity — L5: an employee, vendor, or other insider deliberately misappropriates organizational funds or assets.

L2 — Prize & Payout Risk — L3: prize calculation; payout eligibility; payout distribution — L4: calculation or eligibility error — L5: an ineligible or incorrect competitor receives a prize payment.

A.5 Legal, Regulatory & Compliance Risk

L2 — Legal Risk — L3: litigation risk; liability risk; intellectual-property risk — L4: unresolved dispute escalation — L5: a material claim or litigation is filed against the organization.

L2 — Regulatory Compliance — L3: fishing regulation compliance; boating regulation compliance; wagering-regulation compliance where applicable — L4: statutory-threshold exposure — L5: the organization or a participant materially violates applicable law or regulation, including a tournament-fraud statute such as Texas Parks and Wildlife Code §66.023 where its statutory prerequisites are satisfied.²³

L2 — Contractual Compliance — L3: sponsor contract compliance; media contract compliance; host contract compliance — L4: non-performance risk — L5: a material contractual obligation to a sponsor, media partner, or host is not performed.

L2 — Privacy & Data Protection — L3: competitor data; customer/fan data — L4: unauthorized-access exposure — L5: protected personal information is disclosed without authorization.

L2 — Ethics & Conduct — L3: bribery/corruption; conflicts of interest; harassment/discrimination — L4: improper-benefit exposure — L5: an employee or official improperly accepts consideration affecting official duties.

A.6 Technology, Cyber & Data Risk

L2 — Cybersecurity — L3: unauthorized access; malware/ransomware; account compromise — L4: credential or system compromise — L5: an attacker compromises tournament scoring or operational systems.

L2 — Competition Technology — L3: scoring-platform reliability; scale/equipment reliability; tracking/GPS reliability — L4: platform or device failure during competition — L5: scoring-technology failure prevents accurate recording of catches during a live event.

L2 — Data Integrity — L3: accuracy; completeness; availability; lineage — L4: unauthorized or erroneous data modification — L5: a competition record is corrupted or improperly modified.

L2 — Technology Resilience — L3: redundancy; recovery; capacity — L4: single point of technology failure — L5: critical tournament technology becomes unavailable during a scheduled event.

L2 — Emerging Technology/AI — L3: AI-enabled misuse; synthetic media; new fishing technology — L4: rules gap relative to new capability — L5: a new technology (sonar, AI-assisted pattern analysis, remote-data capability) creates a competitive advantage not addressed by existing rules.

A.7 Competitor, Workforce & Human Capital Risk

L2 — Competitor Welfare — L3: physical safety; mental wellbeing; safeguarding — L4: inadequate welfare protocol — L5: a competitor suffers material harm arising from the competition environment.

L2 — Workforce Capability — L3: staffing adequacy; official training; retention — L4: capability or capacity shortfall — L5: an insufficient number of qualified officials compromises event delivery.

L2 — Leadership & Succession — L3: key-person dependency; succession planning — L4: unplanned leadership loss — L5: loss of a critical executive creates material operational or strategic interruption.

L2 — Culture & Conduct — L3: ethical/speak-up culture; retaliation risk; rule-compliance culture — L4: underreporting of known misconduct — L5: participants become aware of misconduct but do not report it, an exposure MLF's 2026 rules address by requiring competitors to report concerns about possible violations.⁸

A.8 Fisheries, Environmental & Conservation Risk

This domain is distinct to professional fishing because the natural resource is the competitive playing field.

L2 — Fishery Health — L3: population health; habitat quality; invasive species — L4: population decline — L5: material deterioration in a bass population reduces the competitive viability of a fishery.

L2 — Fish Care — L3: handling practices; livewell management; weigh-in mortality; release practices — L4: elevated mortality risk — L5: tournament handling or livewell practices cause abnormal fish mortality.

L2 — Environmental Conditions — L3: drought/water-level risk; water-quality risk; harmful algal blooms; invasive vegetation — L4: fishery unsuitability — L5: environmental conditions render a scheduled fishery unsuitable for competition.

L2 — Conservation/Social License — L3: resource-steward relationships; public perception; access rights — L4: constituent opposition — L5: tournament practices generate material opposition from resource managers or the recreational-fishing community.

A.9 Commercial, Media & Reputation Risk

L2 — Sponsorship & Partner Risk — L3: sponsor conduct risk; sponsor concentration — L4: activation or renewal shortfall — L5: a major sponsor exits following a controversy.

L2 — Media & Broadcast Risk — L3: production risk; distribution risk; editorial-integrity risk — L4: broadcast-delivery failure — L5: a material broadcast or streaming failure affects a marquee event.

L2 — Reputation & Trust — L3: organizational trust; competition trust; leadership trust — L4: publicized-controversy exposure — L5: a publicized incident materially reduces constituent confidence in the organization. A catch-manipulation event is not itself reputational risk; reputational damage of this kind is a potential secondary consequence.

L2 — Social/Digital Media Risk — L3: misinformation; viral-controversy risk; impersonation — L4: uncontrolled narrative spread — L5: false or misleading content materially damages the organization's or an event's public standing.

A.10 External & Emerging Risk

L2 — Economic Risk — L3: macroeconomic conditions; sponsor-budget conditions — L4: discretionary-spending contraction — L5: economic contraction materially reduces participation or sponsorship spending.

L2 — Political/Regulatory Change — L3: fishing-regulation change; boating-regulation change; wagering-policy change — L4: unanticipated regulatory shift — L5: a regulatory change materially alters permitted tournament operations.

L2 — Climate/Severe Weather — L3: extreme-heat risk; storm risk; drought risk — L4: weather-driven event interruption — L5: extreme weather prevents a scheduled competition from proceeding safely.

L2 — Public Access/Infrastructure — L3: boat-ramp access; waterway access; local-restriction risk — L4: access-point loss — L5: loss of public access to a fishery prevents a viable event at that location.

L2 — Emerging Sports Risk — L3: wagering-market evolution; new-technology adoption; changing participant behavior — L4: governance lag relative to a new development — L5: an emerging development (new wagering markets, new competition technology) creates an exposure not yet addressed by existing governance.

Appendix B: COSO ERM Methodology Note

This appendix contains the enterprise-risk-management mechanics behind this review, kept out of the main text so the body can focus on evidence and governance choices. It is provided for readers — risk committees, auditors, or anyone wanting to see the analytical scaffolding — who want to verify the method rather than take it on faith.

B.1 Why This Review Is Organized This Way

Enterprise risk management does not start with a catalog of misconduct. It starts with an organization's purpose and objectives, and asks what could impair them. For a professional bass-fishing sanctioning body or tournament operator, relevant objectives reasonably include producing fair and authentic competition; maintaining competitor confidence; attracting and retaining audiences; maintaining sponsor and commercial relationships; delivering reliable results; protecting fishery resources; complying with legal and regulatory obligations; and sustaining the economic viability of the competition platform. This review uses the COSO ERM framework's general sequence — mission and objectives, then risks to achieving them, then assessment, then response, then residual exposure, then monitoring²⁴ — as an organizing discipline, applied to this specific risk category. COSO does not prescribe the specific ten-domain taxonomy, the treatment of Competition Integrity as a standalone top-level category, the L1–L5 hierarchy in Appendix A, or the control-effectiveness/credibility distinction below; those are this review's own analytical choices, built using COSO's general method rather than mandated by it.

B.2 A Worked Example: Deliberate Catch Manipulation

To make the method concrete, this section works through a single hypothetical before the main text applies the same logic to real cases: *a competitor deliberately alters a bass presented for scoring so that its recorded weight exceeds its legitimate competitive weight.*

Where it sits in the taxonomy. Competition Integrity Risk → Competition Manipulation → Catch Manipulation → Catch-Weight Manipulation → deliberate artificial enhancement of a competition catch → an actual incident (a particular competitor altering a particular fish). The manipulated fish itself is not the risk the enterprise carries — it is one manifestation of a risk that sits above it in the hierarchy, which is why a single incident should prompt asking what it reveals about the broader exposure rather than being treated as a closed matter once the individual is sanctioned.

Drivers. Potential drivers include prize and qualification incentives, commercial or sponsorship incentives, the physical opportunity to manipulate a catch, limited verification, low perceived probability of detection, inconsistent enforcement, ambiguity in rules, third-party assistance, inadequate chain of custody, emerging technology, and wagering-related incentives where relevant. These are hypotheses to be tested against evidence, not assumed explanations for any actual incident.

Inherent risk (before controls). Relevant questions: how feasible is this method, how easily can it be replicated, what incentives exist, how likely is detection without a dedicated control, what competitive outcome could it affect, how rapidly could consequences develop, and how long would they persist. These map to likelihood, severity, and — in COSO’s fuller risk-assessment vocabulary — velocity (how fast consequences develop once a risk materializes) and persistence (how long they last). This review does not attempt a numerical inherent-risk score; the goal is to establish the nature of the exposure before evaluating controls.

Existing controls, in full. Preventive controls include formal tournament rules, prohibited-conduct provisions, information restrictions, eligibility requirements, equipment restrictions, off-limits provisions, competitor reporting obligations, codes of conduct, and sanctions designed to deter prohibited behavior. MLF’s 2026 rules, for example, require honest catch and weight reporting and impose penalties including loss of weight, winnings, disqualification, and future-event exclusion.^{8 45} Detective controls include tournament officials, in-boat officials in applicable formats, catch observation, weigh-in inspection, scoring verification, video, live-scoring systems such as SCORETRACKER, truth-verification procedures used by certain organizations,⁹ competitor reports, and other event-specific monitoring. Investigative controls include tournament-director review, interviews, examination of communications or other evidence, external law-enforcement involvement where applicable, independent examiners in certain appeal procedures,¹⁰ and formal review or appeal mechanisms. Corrective controls include catch or weight removal, disqualification, prize forfeiture, points adjustments, suspension, future-event exclusion, and result correction.

Control effectiveness vs. integrity-system credibility. These are related but distinct evaluations, and this review keeps them separate rather than treating credibility as a fourth item on the same checklist as design and operation. *Control assessment* asks three conventional questions: does the control exist, is it appropriately designed for the risk it targets, and does it operate as designed in practice. *Integrity-system credibility* asks a different question: does the resulting process generate sufficiently reliable, explainable, consistent, and procedurally defensible outcomes to sustain constituent confidence? A technically effective control can still produce a credibility problem if

constituents cannot reasonably understand or trust how a consequential decision was reached — and conversely, constituent dissatisfaction with an outcome does not by itself establish that a control was ineffective.

Why the same incident can mean very different things. The same attempted manipulation can produce radically different consequences depending on how the control environment responds. In one scenario, a competitor manipulates one fish; the anomaly is immediately identified, the fish is inspected, evidence is clear, the catch is rejected, the competitor is disqualified, the investigation is prompt, and constituents accept the process — the manipulation occurred, but the event demonstrates the controls worked. In another, the identical manipulation goes undetected, the competitor wins and is paid, the result is certified, evidence emerges later, the investigation is inconsistent or delayed, and the result becomes publicly contested. The manipulation method is identical in both; the consequence is not. The difference is the effectiveness and credibility of the control environment — which is exactly what the case evidence in the main text tests against the sport’s actual recent history.

B.3 The Governing Question, and How to Apply It

Several different functions can look at the same event and legitimately ask different questions: rules enforcement asks what happened and what sanction applies; investigation asks what facts can be established; integrity management asks how this type of threat should be prevented, detected, investigated, and adjudicated; and enterprise risk management asks what the event reveals about the organization’s exposure, the assumptions behind its risk assessment, and the effectiveness and credibility of the controls it relies on. Governance then asks whether the resulting exposure is acceptable, who owns it, and what response — if any — is required. Conflating these questions is a common source of confusion in how integrity incidents get discussed.

For any significant incident, the test this review applies is: what does this event reveal about the nature, likelihood, and potential severity of the underlying risk; the assumptions supporting the existing risk assessment; and the design, operating effectiveness, and credibility of the controls intended to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to it? Does that evidence materially change the assessment of exposure, and if so, is the resulting exposure still one the organization should be comfortable carrying?

A single incident should not automatically be read as either an isolated event or proof of a systemic problem. Indicators consistent with an isolated event: an unusual or difficult-to-replicate method, immediate detection, controls that otherwise operate

effectively, no similar prior intelligence, no recurring control exceptions, no evidence of broader participation. Indicators warranting broader reassessment: a method that is readily replicable, low detection probability, similar prior events, repeated control exceptions, inconsistent enforcement, multiple participants implicated, known but unreported conduct, incentives that materially exceed prior assumptions, or management previously aware of the vulnerability. The governing question is whether a given event is an anomaly within a sound system or evidence of a vulnerability inherent in the system.

A sports integrity system can fail in two opposite directions, and a mature framework has to manage both. For a specific screening or detection tool, statistical terminology is appropriate: a false negative is manipulation the tool fails to detect; a false positive is an adverse tool result where manipulation did not occur. But not every investigative or adjudicative failure fits that vocabulary — an inconsistent process or a poorly corroborated finding is not a “false positive” in the statistical sense even when it causes comparable harm. For the integrity system as a whole, this review uses the broader terms **wrongful non-detection** (manipulation occurs and the system as a whole fails to catch it) and **unreliable adverse determination** (the system produces a sanction or public suspicion not adequately supported by the process that generated it). Both impair fairness, in opposite directions; the goal is credible outcomes supported by proportionate, reliable controls, not maximum enforcement.

B.4 Residual Risk, Appetite, Tolerance, and Target Risk

The sequence this review applies, once evidence and existing controls are on the table, is: **Inherent Risk → Existing Controls → Current Residual Risk → Risk Appetite / Risk Tolerance → Target Risk → Additional Response, if Required.**

Risk appetite — the type and amount of this risk the organization is willing to accept in pursuit of its objectives — can reasonably be stated as: no appetite for deliberate manipulation of competition, paired with recognition that no system can eliminate every possibility of misconduct.

Risk tolerance — the acceptable variation in performance relative to a specific objective, such as reliably distinguishing compliant from non-compliant competitors — is where control-performance expectations belong: an acceptable rate of contested or reversed adverse determinations, an acceptable time-to-resolution for appeals, and expectations concerning the reliability, explainability, and defensibility of adjudicative processes, measured against actual performance.

Target risk is the level of residual exposure management intends to achieve if current residual risk is found to exceed appetite or tolerance. Some residual risk is inherent to any control environment. The important condition is whether current residual risk exceeds accepted appetite or tolerance. That comparison, not the mere presence of incidents, is what would justify additional treatment, and it is the comparison underlying the main text's conclusions.

Notes

Numbered sequentially in order of first assignment; several notes are cited more than once in the text and carry the same number at each occurrence.

1. B.A.S.S., "B.A.S.S. Announces 2026 Elite Series Television Broadcast Schedule on FOX and FS1," Bassmaster.com, September 2025, <https://www.bassmaster.com/elite/news/b-a-s-s-announces-2026-elite-series-television-broadcast-schedule-on-fox-and-fs1/> (accessed August 2026).
2. B.A.S.S., "B.A.S.S., FOX Announce Expanded 2025 Television Schedule," Bassmaster.com, December 16, 2024, <https://www.bassmaster.com/elite/news/b-a-s-s-fox-announce-expanded-2025-television-schedule/> (accessed August 2026).
3. B.A.S.S., "2025 Elite Series and AOY Payouts," Bassmaster.com, December 2024, <https://www.bassmaster.com/news/2025-elite-and-aoy-payouts/> (accessed August 2026).
4. Major League Fishing / Outdoor Sportsman Group, "Watch LIVE Sunday: MLF Bass Pro Shops REDCREST 2026 Presented by Mercury & Lowrance," The Outdoor Wire, April 2026, <https://www.theoutdoorwire.com/releases/2026/04/watch-live-sunday-mlf-bass-pro-shops-redcrest-2026-presented-by-mercury-lowrance/> (accessed August 2026).
5. World Bass Enterprises, "World Bass Enterprises Unveils 'The Champions' Tournament Featuring Top 50 Anglers and Record-Setting \$3 Million Purse," PR Newswire, February 3, 2026, <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/world-bass-enterprises-unveils-the-champions-tournament-featuring-top-50-anglers-and-record-setting-3-million-purse-302677644.html> (accessed August 2026).
6. World Bass Enterprises, official website, "About," <https://www.worldbassenterprises.com/about> (accessed August 2026), current total purse listed as \$3.25 million.
7. World Bass Enterprises, "What the New 'The Champions' Tournament Means for Pro Bass Fishing," Sports Illustrated / Fishing on SI, February 2026, <https://www.si.com/onsi/fishing/bass-fishing/what-the-champions-tournament-means-for-pro-bass-fishing> (accessed August 2026), quoting WBE founder Brian Bird on bringing "the two biggest tours together to fish on the same lake."
8. Major League Fishing, Bass Fishing League official rules, "21. Truth Verification Test," MajorLeagueFishing.com, <https://majorleaguefishing.com/circuits/bfl/rules/> (accessed August 2026). *This source documents BFL-circuit rules specifically; the extension to Bass Pro Tour rules is independently confirmed at note 45.*
9. B.A.S.S., "Rules Are Rules: Truth Verification," Bassmaster.com, May 9, 2022, <https://www.bassmaster.com/news/rules-are-rule-truth-verification/> (accessed August 2026), describing the Bassmaster Elite Series rulebook's truth-verification clause and protocol.
10. B.A.S.S., "B.A.S.S. Statement Regarding Elite Series Angler David Mullins," Bassmaster.com, April 13, 2026, <https://www.bassmaster.com/elite/news/b-a-s-s-statement-regarding-elite-series-angler-david-mullins/> (accessed August 2026), describing the independent-examiner appeal process (full discussion at note 19).
11. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office, "Two Fishermen Plead Guilty on Criminal Charges for Cheating During the Lake Erie Walleye Trail Tournament," press release, March 27, 2023, <https://www.ccprosecutor.us/two-fisherman-plead-guilty-cheating/> (accessed August 2026).
12. "Tournament Anglers Who Cheated in Lake Erie Walleye Championship Sentenced to Jail Time," Outdoor News, May 11, 2023, <https://www.outdoornews.com/2023/05/11/tournament-anglers-who-cheated-in-lake-erie-walleye-championship-sentenced-to-jail-time/> (accessed August 2026).
13. "Angler Charged with Fraud in Big Bass Event on Lake Fork," Wired2Fish, December 2023 (reporting on the September 2018 event and subsequent indictment), <https://www.wired2fish.com/news/angler-charged-with-fraud-in-big-bass-event-on-lake-fork> (accessed August 2026), citing a Texas Parks and Wildlife Department statement.

14. "Texas Fishing Cheating Scandal, Explained," Yahoo Sports, March 26, 2026, <https://sports.yahoo.com/article/texas-fishing-cheating-scandal-explained-why-a-man-could-face-10-years-in-prison-for-allegedly-tampering-with-bass-155725490.html> (accessed August 2026); "Lake Fork Cheating Bust: Willow Park Man Arrested After Stuffing Bass," Angler's Pro Tackle & Outdoors, March 2026, <https://anglersprotackle.com/blogs/news/lake-fork-cheating-bust-willow-park-man-arrested-after-stuffing-bass-with-lead-weights> (accessed August 2026).
15. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, as reported in "LDWF: Fisherman Used Lead Sinkers to Increase Weight of Fish During Bass Tournament on Toledo Bend," KPLC, May 24, 2024, <https://www.kplctv.com/2024/05/24/ldwf-fisherman-used-lead-sinkers-used-increase-weight-fish-during-bass-tournament-toledo-bend/> (accessed August 2026).
16. Illinois Department of Natural Resources, as reported in "Something Fishy: Indiana Man Caught Allegedly Cheating in Illinois Bass Fishing Tournament," FOX8, May 24, 2024, <https://fox8.com/news/something-fishy-indiana-man-caught-allegedly-cheating-in-illinois-bass-fishing-tournament/> (accessed August 2026).
17. B.A.S.S., "Thompkins Disqualified from St. Lawrence Elite," Bassmaster.com, August 17, 2024, <https://www.bassmaster.com/elite/news/thompkins-disqualified-from-st-lawrence-elite/> (accessed August 2026).
18. "Bassmaster Elite Series Rookie Disqualified for Failing a Polygraph Test," Yahoo Sports / Outdoor Life, August 2024, <https://www.outdoorlife.com/fishing/bassmaster-elite-rookie-disqualified-polygraph/> (accessed August 2026).
19. B.A.S.S., "B.A.S.S. Statement Regarding Elite Series Angler David Mullins," Bassmaster.com, April 13, 2026, <https://www.bassmaster.com/elite/news/b-a-s-s-statement-regarding-elite-series-angler-david-mullins/> (accessed August 2026).
20. National Research Council, *The Polygraph and Lie Detection* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003), Executive Summary, <https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/10420/chapter/2> (accessed August 2026). *This source supports the general distinction between specific-incident and screening-application polygraph testing and the greater evidentiary uncertainty associated with screening. It does not itself address repeated-examination discordance in a single case (the Mullins-specific inference remains the author's analytical conclusion) and was not consulted to validate any tournament-specific protocol.*
21. Major League Fishing, "Martin, O'Connell Disqualified from Bass Fishing League Regional," press release, October 30, 2025, <https://majorleaguefishing.com/bfl/martin-oconnell-disqualified-from-bass-fishing-league-regional/> (accessed August 2026).
22. Major League Fishing, "Martin Reinstated for 2026 BFL All-American Following Disclosures," press release, December 2, 2025, <https://majorleaguefishing.com/press-releases/martin-reinstated-for-2026-bfl-all-american-following-disclosures/> (accessed August 2026).
23. Tex. Parks & Wild. Code § 66.023(a)–(d), Texas Statutes, <https://law.justia.com/codes/texas/parks-and-wildlife-code/title-5/subtitle-b/chapter-66/subchapter-a/section-66-023> (accessed August 2026); see also FindLaw, <https://codes.findlaw.com/tx/parks-and-wildlife-code/parks-wild-sect-66-023/>. Subsection (c) addresses the sponsor/organizer notification obligation; subsection (d) sets the misdemeanor/felony threshold at \$10,000 in prize value for a single category.
24. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, *Enterprise Risk Management — Integrating with Strategy and Performance*, Executive Summary (June 2017), official publication available via COSO.org, <https://www.coso.org/Shared%20Documents/2017-COSO-ERM-Integrating-with-Strategy-and-Performance-Executive-Summary.pdf> (accessed August 2026), confirming risk appetite, risk tolerance, and portfolio-view terminology as used in this review.
25. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption," press release, May 27, 2015,

<https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and> (accessed August 2026).

26. FIFA, "Revised FIFA Statutes Available on FIFA.com," Inside.fifa.com, April 26, 2016, <https://inside.fifa.com/news/revised-fifa-statutes-available-on-fifa-com-2782935> (accessed August 2026); FIFA, "Extraordinary FIFA Congress, Zurich 2016," Inside.fifa.com, <https://inside.fifa.com/news/extraordinary-fifa-congress-zurich-2016-2857429> (accessed August 2026), confirming approval by 179 of 207 member associations on February 26, 2016, and the reform package's core elements (term limits, separation of political/management functions, disclosure of individual compensation).
27. Christina Macfarlane, "FIFA Fires Investigators Who Brought Down Sepp Blatter," CNN, May 10, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/10/football/fifa-ethics-investigation-judges> (accessed August 2026), reporting the removal of Ethics Committee investigatory chamber chair Cornel Borbély and adjudicatory chamber chair Hans-Joachim Eckert, both of whom characterized the decision as "political," and Eckert's statement that "the reform process is... dead."
28. World Anti-Doping Agency, "McLaren Independent Investigation Report – Part I," July 18, 2016, <https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/mclaren-independent-investigation-report-part-i> (accessed August 2026); WADA, "WADA Statement: Independent Investigation Confirms Russian State Manipulation of the Doping Control Process," <https://www.wada-ama.org/en/news/wada-statement-independent-investigation-confirms-russian-state-manipulation-doping-control> (accessed August 2026), summarizing Part II findings (published December 9, 2016).
29. International Olympic Committee, "International Testing Agency," Olympics.com, <https://www.olympics.com/ioc/fight-against-doping/ita> (accessed August 2026), confirming the Olympic Summit's proposal of an independent testing/sanctioning system in October 2015, the ITA's inclusion among the IOC's 12 principles adopted March 2017, WADA Executive Committee ratification of the first Foundation Board in October 2017, and full operational status in July 2018; World Anti-Doping Agency, "WADA Welcomes International Testing Agency Investigation Report into Activities of International Weightlifting Federation," press release, <https://www.wada-ama.org/en/news/wada-welcomes-international-testing-agency-investigation-report-activities-international> (accessed August 2026), illustrating ITA's subsequent operational role independent of both WADA and the federations it investigates.
30. ESPNcricinfo, "10 Years After Cronje: A Timeline of Match-Fixing in the 2000s," July 3, 2010, <https://www.cricinfo.com/story/10-years-after-cronje-a-timeline-of-match-fixing-in-the-2000s-464111> (accessed August 2026), confirming the April 7, 2000 charges and Lord Paul Condon's June 26, 2000 appointment as director of the ICC's anti-corruption investigation.
31. International Cricket Council, "ICC to Strengthen Anti-Corruption Approach," ICC press release as republished by Around the Rings/Infobae, 2013, <https://www.infobae.com/aroundtherings/articles/2021/07/12/icc-to-strengthen-anti-corruption-approach> (accessed August 2026), an ICC-sourced release referring to "The Chairman of the Anti-Corruption and Security Unit (ACSU), Sir Ronnie Flanagan," confirming ACSU as the unit's historical name; International Cricket Council, "ICC Announces Appointment of Alex Marshall as General Manager – Anti-Corruption Unit," ICC press release as republished by Around the Rings/Infobae, <https://www.infobae.com/aroundtherings/articles/2021/07/12/icc-announces-appointment-of-alex-marshall-as-general-manager-anti-corruption-unit> (accessed August 2026), confirming current "Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)" naming and the general-manager succession since 2000; Wisden, "Hell in a Handcart," ESPNcricinfo, September 12, 2015, <https://www.espncricinfo.com/wisdenalmanack/content/story/908207.html> (accessed August 2026), for the under-resourcing characterization.
32. Independent Review Panel, *Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis*, Interim Report, April 2018, https://www.wimbledon.com/pdf/Independent_Review_Panel_Interim_Report_and_Record_of_Evidence.pdf (accessed August 2026); full final report at <https://www.atptour.com/-/media/files/independent-review-of-integrity-in-tennis-document-2018.pdf> (accessed August 2026), Chapter 8, confirming TIU's 2008 formation following the 2008 Environmental Review.

33. "Tennis Hasn't Grappled with 'Serious' Match Fixing Problem, Scathing Review Finds," BuzzFeed News, April 25, 2018, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/johntemplon/scathing-review-finds-serious-match-fixing-scourge-in-tennis> (accessed August 2026), describing the January 2016 BBC/BuzzFeed investigation's findings regarding a 16-player suspected network.
34. Same source as note 33; the Interim Report is quoted directly stating the TIU "has insufficient resources to address the problem now faced."
35. "Corruption Watch," reporting on the Independent Review Panel's December 2018 final report recommendations, including expanding TIU staffing and reach, <https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/businessmirror/20181221/282127817606226> (accessed August 2026).
36. "Beyond the Baseline – How Tennis Is Stepping Up Its Approach to Anti-Corruption," Linklaters SportingLinks, April 2021, <https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/blogs/sportinglinks/2021/april/beyond-the-baseline-how-tennis-is-stepping-up-its-approach-to-anti-corruption> (accessed August 2026), confirming the TIU-to-ITIA transition. *Precise ITIA launch date was not independently re-confirmed to the day in this pass.*
37. World Athletics, "Independent Athletics Integrity Unit Is Operational," press release, April 5, 2017, <https://worldathletics.org/news/press-release/independent-athletics-integrity-unit> (accessed August 2026), confirming operational commencement on April 3, 2017.
38. "Biathlon Integrity Unit to Be Set Up by IBU in Response to Doping, Fraud and Corruption Allegations," *insidethegames.biz*, <https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1078943/biathlon-integrity-unit-to-be-set-up-by-ibu-in-response-to-doping-fraud-and-corruption-allegations> (accessed August 2026), explicitly linking AIU's creation to the Lamine Diack affair. The primary source is the World Athletics release at note 37.
39. International Biathlon Union, "IBU Proposes Establishment of Independent Biathlon Integrity Unit," press release, May 8, 2019, <https://www.antidopingdatabase.com/news/ibu-proposes-establishment-of-independent-biathlon-integrity-unit> (accessed August 2026); *insidethegames.biz* (note 38 source) for the Besseberg/Resch allegation background.
40. Biathlon Integrity Unit, "About Us," official website, <https://biathlonintegrity.com/about-us/> (accessed August 2026); "Integrity Unit Structure & Purpose," *Biathlonworld.com*, <https://www.biathlonworld.com/inside-ibu/anti-doping/integrity-unit-structure-pupose> (accessed August 2026), confirming the unit's official name (Biathlon Integrity Unit), operational independence, and structural placement within the IBU, and the October 2019 Constitutional adoption.
41. Pim Verschuuren, "Integrity Washing? The Implementation of Reporting Mechanisms by International Sports Organisations," *Journal of Global Sport Management* 8, no. 4 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2021.1882204> (accessed August 2026).
42. Michael Sam, Cecilia Stenling, and Minhyeok Tak, "Integrity Governance: A New Reform Agenda for Sport?" (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1177/10126902221125600> (accessed August 2026); see also Verschuuren (2021) as engaged by subsequent commentary, e.g., "Assessing Governance Without Government," <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19406940.2023.2215809> (accessed August 2026).
43. Boyd Duckett, MLF President and CEO, statement to Kurt Mazurek, "A Turning Point for Tournament Integrity? MLF and B.A.S.S. Announce Major Updates," *Sports Illustrated / Fishing on SI*, December 5, 2025, <https://www.si.com/onsi/fishing/bass-fishing/tournament-integrity-mlf-bass-updates-2026> (accessed August 2026). Quotation verified verbatim against this source; original uses an en dash where the manuscript's typography uses an em dash — a non-substantive typographic normalization.
44. Major League Fishing, "MLF Announces 2026 Bass Pro Tour Schedule," *MajorLeagueFishing.com*, July 2025, <https://majorleaguefishing.com/bass-pro-tour/mlf-announces-2026-bass-pro-tour-schedule/> (accessed August 2026), listing official 2026 Bass Pro Tour sponsors including Bass Pro Shops, Mercury, O'Reilly Auto Parts, Suzuki Marine, and Toyota among the full roster.

45. Major League Fishing, "2026 Bass Pro Tour Rules," MajorLeagueFishing.com, <https://majorleaguefishing.com/2026-bass-pro-tour-rules/> (accessed August 2026); see also <https://majorleaguefishing.com/circuits/bass-pro-tour/rules/> (accessed August 2026), confirming Bass Pro Tour-specific (not merely BFL-circuit) rules providing for disqualification, loss of weight/points/winnings, prohibition from future MLF events, and a competitor obligation to report concerns about possible rule violations by another competitor.

About the Author

Jim Brown is a sports-business executive and risk adviser whose experience includes designing enterprise risk frameworks spanning hundreds of thousands of participants, tens of thousands of annual events, and large officiating populations. His professional work includes fraud investigations that produced felony charges, board-level risk reporting, leading integrity partnerships across the Americas, and briefing U.S. Senate Commerce Committee staff, the FBI's Crime and Corruption in Sport and Gaming Program, state gaming regulators, and federal regulators on sports wagering and prediction-markets integrity. He also competes in father-son amateur bass tournaments.

This report is independent work by Jim Brown. It was not prepared on behalf of, sponsored by, endorsed by, or reviewed by any third party, and the views expressed are his own. It uses no confidential information, client information, proprietary methods or nonpublic information. All references rely solely on publicly available information obtained through public sources.

Jim Brown, Managing Principal, S.P.O.R.T. Enterprise Risk Advisory Practice

jim@sportenterpriserisk.com | [linkedin.com/in/jimbrown-ERM](https://www.linkedin.com/in/jimbrown-ERM)